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I. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Current security research is largely top-down, where the 
most exposed layers --- the network/ application layers --- 
are first secured, and the lower layers are secured as and 
when threats appear. Security, thus, has become an arms race 
to bottom. For every software mitigation strategy today, 
vulnerabilities in the software layer below it can be used to 
attack and weaken the mitigation strategy. There are many 
examples of such attacks in the literature including those that 
attack anti-virus, libraries, operating systems, hypervisors, 
and BIOS routines. 
 
A solution to the above problem is to push the security 
mechanisms down to hardware, which is typically 
immutable. Growing on-chip transistor budgets provide the 
opportunity to explore this possibility.  In addition to 
offering immutable security, there are two further advantages 
to implementing security mechanisms in hardware. First, 
hardware supported security mechanisms can be much more 
energy-efficient compared to software only mechanisms.  
Given that energy- and power-efficiency significantly 
influence computing today, hardware support could very 
well be necessary for security mechanisms to gain traction in 
many real world settings.  Second, implementing security 
mechanisms can provide unmatched visibility into execution.  
This provides an opportunity for new security techniques. 
 
The SPARCHS project is considering a new computer 
systems design methodology that considers security as a 
first-order design requirement at all levels, starting from 
hardware, in addition to the usual design requirements such 
as programmability, usability, speed, and power/energy-
efficiency. The rest of the paper describes the proposed 





II. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
Directly implementing security mechanisms in hardware 
poses a significant problem. First, since hardware is finite 
not all known security mechanisms can be implemented in 
hardware. Second, hardware is less flexible than software, 
so it cannot be easily updated when new attacks are 
discovered1. Thus, ideally, hardware mechanisms should 
also be able to cover attacks that are not yet discovered. 
This begs the question what hardware mechanisms can 
cover a wide variety of known and unknown attacks?  
 
Instead of trying to discover unknown attacks, which is 
hard, and develop specific defenses, which is also hard, our 
strategy is to mimic the defenses from the biological world 
where a fantastic number of defenses have evolved over 
many thousands of years to survive constantly attacking 
predators. Our goal is to find counterparts to successful 
biological protection mechanisms and implement them in 
hardware. 
 
The benefits of bio-inspired approaches to security have 
been mentioned as a promising direction in several  
reports[1,2]. The idea of applying bio inspired security 
principles to the hardware level is the key novel contribution 
of the SPARCHS project. Next we touch upon some 
biological protection mechanisms and then describe their 
hardware/software formulations that can mimic these 
mechanisms. 
 
A. Biological defenses  
 
Defensive strategy is pervasive at all levels in the animal 
and plant kingdom where existence is constantly threatened 
due to predators and environmental vagaries. At the 
molecular level, our genetic code is suspected to contain 
                                                            
1 FPGAs offer an opportunity to update software in the field but 
currently have limited utility in general purpose computing. 
high-level of redundancy, at the cellular level lymphocytes 
offer innate protection against viruses and microbes, at the 
organ level, redundancy (e.g., two kidneys) and regeneration 
(e.g., skin cuts, lizards dropping tails under attacks) allow 
continuous function and recovery under attack, and 
organisms have amazing ability to learn from past attacks 
(e.g., vaccination.) In many cases, multiple organisms co-
operate (e.g., microbiomes) from symbiotic relationship to 
provide immunity over and above innate and adaptive 
immunity. Innate immunity mechanisms is typically a first, 
generic response to attacks from foreign organisms. Typical 
functions of innate immunity include capturing cellular 
debris, foreign particles and invading microorganisms. The 
adaptive immune response provides facilities to recognize 
and remember specific attack vectors, and provide stronger 
protection as more attacks are encountered in future.  
 
In the biological world, the attackers have also evolved 
many sophisticated techniques to thwart existing defenses. 
The most notorious of the attackers attack the immune 
system itself (e.g., HIV) and is difficult to destroy because it 
constantly changes its tertiary structure (polymorphism), 
which guarantees the virus a safe harbor in the host. To 
provide these amazing security features organisms spend 
nearly 30% of their energy in defense. Given the success of 
flora and fauna, the defensive strategies used in biological 
systems are certainly worth emulating.  
 
To summarize, the biological techniques, we aim to provide 
hardware support to mimic the following biological 
primitives: (1) Innate Immunity for detection and isolation,  
(2) Diversity and polymorphism for prevention, (3) 
Symbiotic Immunity for implementing protection and 
detection techniques, (4) Adaptive Immunity for prevention, 
(5) Optimized redundant execution for continued execution, 
(6) Autotomy to contain damage when all else fails.  
 
B. Hardware Analogues  
 
Innate Immunity One basic function of innate immunity is 
to identify and contain foreign particles. Translated to the 
computer systems, this translates to ensuring untrusted data 
does not reach confidential code, and trusted data is not sent 
to untrusted code. Information flow tracking (IFT) 
essentially provides the above functionality. While IFT is no 
means a new technique, it has been difficult to implement 
correctly without hardware support. Verifying the data flow 
of program is insufficient to verify that no illegal 
information flows occur in the program. Current solution is 
to allow implicit flows by converting all data dependences 
to control dependences. In the SPARCHS project we are 
considering how the implicit flows, or the flow of 
information through control dependences, must be 
determined with static analysis as information can flow 
through segments of code that do not execute. This 
information will be conveyed to the hardware to track these 
flows.  
 
Diversity and Polymorphism The key idea in digital 
defensive polymorphism is to change the execution of a 
program dynamically to thwart attackers. One of the 
simplest ways to change execution is to change the 
hardware each time a program executes. We call this type of 
shape-shifting hardware as polymorphic hardware. 
Polymorphic hardware succeeds against attackers by 
purposely injecting randomness into program execution. 
This method could have three very useful impacts for 
security at different levels of execution:  
 
1)  At the hardware level this architecture would make 
would make side-channel attacks very difficult, because 
it is always harder to attack a moving or unpredictable 
target. Conceptually each execution of a program 
happens on a different hardware, and with this type of 
uncertainty the attacker cannot reliably interpret of the 
side-channel data. This resilience to side-channels is 
leveraged by symbiotes to avoid detection.  
 
2)  Polymorphism can provide resilience against 
semantic attacks: Consider a code-injection attack. The 
attacker takes advantage of knowledge of the programs 
ABI and the instruction’s semantics in the program to 
carry out the attack. With polymorphism at the 
instruction-set level — Instruction-Set Randomization 
(ISR) — this attack can be thwarted because the attacker 
can no longer know the semantics of each instruction.  
 
3) Polymorphism can provide resilience against program 
logic bugs. While most security attacks to date exploit 
bugs in serial programs, more parallel programs are 
being produced because of adoption of multicore 
programs. It is well known that reliable parallel 
programming is harder than sequential programming, 
and it is likely that attackers will take advantage of 
concurrency bugs in the near future.  
 
The polymorphic architecture can decrease the chance of 
security attacks on emerging parallel programs by reducing 
the chance of race conditions because of the diversified, 
random execution substrate. Additionally, polymorphism 
may have a side benefit of improving program performance 
by reducing unintentional contention on shared resources, 
and also enable better testing of programs through automatic 
fuzzing of program execution. The SPARCHS project is 
investigating how these shape-shifting features can be 
implemented in the simplest way into existing processors 
without undue performance impact.  
 
Symbiotic Immunity The idea of how symbiotes can be 
adapted to computer systems was first proposed in the 
Minestrone project at Columbia. At a high-level, the 
symbiote is a small program that is embedded in a host 
program. The symbiote can reside within any arbitrary body 
of software, regardless of its place within the system stack. 
While symbiotes share some commonalities to reference 
monitors in terms of benefits they offer, a key difference is 
that symbiote cannot survive without the host program and 
the host program cannot survive without the symbiote. This 
interdependency is not required for reference monitors. The 
SPARCHS project aims to provide hardware support that 
will allow symbiotes to have this property.  
 
Symbiotes can be supported in hardware through three 
distinct ways that have different easy of implementation vs. 
benefits trade-offs. First, one or few cores in a multicore 
processor may be hidden from all system software by 
modifying the BIOS, and having the symbiotes run on a 
hidden core. Since system software cannot see the disabled 
core, the symbiotes functions cannot be monitored. This 
solution assumes that the hidden core has access to all of the 
on-chip memory, which can be easily architected. The 
second solution is not to disable the cores (thus not reduce 
throughput) but use the shape-shifting polymorphic 
architecture such that no side-channels are possible. Finally, 
the most efficient option is to build a special hardware unit 
that guarantees physical and execution isolation for the 
symbiotes.  
 
Adaptive Immunity Adaptive immunity requires methods 
to learn about normal and abnormal program behaviors. We 
are developing better hardware support to identify 
anomalous execution points by using fine grained 
measurements from on-chip performance counters. We are 
also working on newer performance counter architectures as 
on-chip performance monitors today are tuned for collecting 
information on the common case; in security (and software 
engineering) we are interested more in the uncommon case. 
Other methods for program characterization include 
learning about control and data flow execution graphs. The 
SPARCHS project is investigating hardware primitives that 
can be securely used to learn about program behavior.  
 
Optimized Redundant Execution Mimicking biological 
redundancy in digital systems is fairly obvious. N-
versioning is already a very common approach but it is also 
terribly impractical approach for many modern execution 
environments such as mobile and server environments. We 
are planning to make N-versioning better with compiler and 
hardware optimizations. We plan to use values produced 
from one redundant copy in another to improve the speed of 
the diversified replica or use special purpose 
microarchitectures to quickly communicate values between 
the N-versions.  
 
Autotomy/Apotasis SPARCHS will bring autotomy to 
computing systems by detecting attacks and faults in a 
software subcomponent and responding to it by removing 
the component from the critical system. The goal is to heal 
the programs, and make them available as much as possible. 
SPARCHS Autotomy will employ Rescue Points which are 
locations in the application code in which error handling is 
performed with respect to a given set of foreseen. Rescue 
points basically create a mapping between the set of errors 
that could occur during a program’s execution and the 
limited set of errors that have been explicitly handled in the 
program code. Thus, a failure that would cause the program 
to crash is translated into a return with an error.  
 







While the project’s main focus is on discovering efficient 
hardware primitives for security another important goal is to 
demonstrate how the proposed primitives can be used in 
software. Towards this goal we are developing hardware 
and software for the SPARCHS system. Figure 1 illustrates 
the different facets of the SPARCHS system and how it 
interfaces with existing and proposed research techniques. 
At the hardware level, SPARCHS includes support for 
microarchitecture-level polymorphism, support for memory 
versioning and checkpointing to support roll back and 
recovery, and specially fortified hardware to support 
symbiote execution. These techniques are orthogonal to and 
can be integrated with information flow tracking and strong 
instruction set randomization. SPARCHS guarantees that an 
outside attacker cannot simply turn off the protection 
mechanism. SPARCHS includes a simple management 
layer that provides safe storage of keys and feeds program 
profile information to the SPARCHS compiler. The 
management layer can also provide simple recovery 
services.  
 
SPARCHS is full-system effort and includes many software 
aspects. The SPARCHS compilation suite serves three main 
purposes: first, it combines the application, the symbiote, 
and the symbiote policy into a single binary, and applies 
instruction-set randomization to the binary; second, it 
provides static analysis techniques for managing recovery 
and repair. Finally, it provides analysis to enforce correct 
dynamic information flow in hardware. The SPARCHS 
environment includes toolkits for mining static, dynamic 
and program information to help programmers specify 
policies, symbiote payload libraries, and also standalone 
injection of symbiotes in binaries if necessary.  
 
 
III. CURRENT STATUS 
 
We have been working on this project for three quarters 
now. We have made significant progress on several fronts. 
First, we have created software symbiote infrastructures to 
understand how they should be protected in hardware[3]. 
We are planning to create symbiotes in x86 and ARM to 
demonstrate feasibility in a wide variety of architectures. 
The software port is likely to be completed in the next 
quarter and detailed hardware analysis is going to begin in 
the following years. We have made significant progress on 
hardware support for learning/adaptivity[4]. Existing 
methods for accessing performance counters on x86 
machines seem terribly out-of-date. In fact, popular tools 
like Vtune, PAPI and Oprofile use heavyweight kernel calls 
which perturb hardware measurements. We have created 
new tools that will allow to precisely read the performance 
counters and have about 70x lower overhead compared to 
PAPI. The tool is available for download from: 
http://castl.cs.columbia.edu/limit. This tool is currently 
being used to learn normative execution characteristics of 
programs. As a stepping stone to ISR, we have developed a 
full-system ISR mechanism[5], not just covering single 
program program binaries but including support for DLLs, 
shared libraries, key management etc. Hardware 
modifications and full system prototypes are underway. To 
test our systems we are working on creating new attacks 
(concurrency based[6]) and also demonstration of defense 
mechanisms against such attacks.  There is much exciting 
work to be done in this area. One major open question is 
what further primitives can be added to hardware. Our 
experience with SPARCHS could help answer this question. 
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